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NOTES
FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL
ELECTION COMMISSION$
I. Introduction
In 1974, the United States Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974,' the most comprehensive election law in American
history. For the first time Congress established an independent body, the Fed-
eral Election Commission (FEC), to oversee election legislation.2
In its haste to comply with the public's demand for efficient and honest elec-
tion supervision, Congress arguably created a commission with numerous con-
stitutional deficiencies. Accordingly, a discussion of the possible unconstitutional
elements of the Federal Election Commission's enabling statute and the ap-
propriate remedies needed before the 1976 election is appropriate. In a recent
decision, Buckley v. Valeo,3 the federal Circuit Court for the District of Colum-
bia considered the constitutionality of the FECAA of 1974, passed on several
constitutional issues with respect to the FEC, and found several other constitu-
tional questions unripe for consideration. While the Buckley court concluded
that the FECAA of 1974 was constitutional, the decision must be examined with
respect. to the constitutional issues it decided,4 as well as some issues which the
court found unripe5 or did not address at all.
The principal issues concerning the constitutionality of the FECAA of 1974
which must be resolved are: (1) the constitutionality of the appointment of FEC
members by Congress; (2) the FECAA's satisfaction of the constitutional re-
quirement that election rules and regulations be promulgated "by law"; (3) the
constitutionality of the FECAA's additional requirement of filing campaign
reports for those seeking federal office; and (4) the constitutionality of the en-
forcement powers of the FEC. These issues must be examined and resolved to
determine the soundness of the Buckley court's decision and to determine the
validity of the FEC.
* On January 30, 1976, the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in
Buckley v. Valeo. The Court held the Federal Election Commission unconstitutional, finding
the congressional appointment of FEC members to be a usurpation of the Presidential appoint-
ment power. The Court, however, ruled that the Commission's civil enforcement powers
were constitutional.
I Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U.S.C.A.) [hereinafter cited as FECAA
of 1974], amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as FECA of 1971].
2 2 U.S.C.A. § 437c (Pamphlet 1, 1975).
3 Buckley v. Valeo, Civil No. 75-0001 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 15, 1975). The case came
to the circuit court pursuant to 2 U.S.C.A. § 437h (Pamphlet 1, 1975). This is a special
review provision of the FECAA of 1974. The case was remanded to the district court for the
formulations of constitutional issues.
The issues were first determined by Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1975),
when plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment holding key provisions of the FECAA of 1974 as
unconstitutional.
4 Buckley v. Valeo, Civil No. 75-0001, at 1572 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 15, 1975).
5 Id. at 1576.
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II. The Constitutionality of the Appointment of
the Federal Election Commission
Generally, members of an administrative agency are appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, pursuant to article II, § 1
of the Constitution.6 The FECAA of 1974 establishes an eight-member Com-
mission; four members are appointed by Congress,' two members by the Pres-
ident,8 and two, the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House,9 are
nonvoting members. A statutory attempt to create a congressional power of ap-
pointment must be carefully scrutinized, since article II, § 1 unequivocally
confers such powers on the President: "The President shall nominate with the
advice and consent of the Senate." An obvious problem thus arises with the
separation of powers since, under the FECAA, Congress is both creating a com-
mission and appointing its members.
The Buckley court held that the appointment process was constitutional,
reasoning that the FEC is not an administrative but a legislative agency which
does not require appointment by the President pursuant to article II, § 1.
A. The Federal Election Commission: A Legislative Agency
The United States Code contains no statutory definition of a legislative
agency,"0 and despite numerous references to the FEC as a legislative agency,"
the Buckley court never defined the term. The court relied principally on
Springer v. Philippine Islands2 in characterizing the FEC as a legislative agency.
In Springer, the defendants were members of a national management board ap-
pointed by the Philippine Legislature." The Governor General of the Philip-
pines challenged these appointments, arguing that the doctrine of separation of
powers constitutionally limited a legislative body to performing legislative func-
tions, thus prohibiting the Philippine Legislature from making appointments.
The Springer court agreed with the Governor General, holding that appoint-
ment was beyond the scope of a legislative body, a body described as a govern-
mental unit whose primary purpose is making law, and only incidentally in-
volved in the duties of the executive or judicial branches of government.' This
distinction has been accepted and reiterated in subsequent Supreme Court
decisions.'6 This judicial description of a legislative body is the closest analogue
6 Administrative agencies are normally appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970); 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1970); 49
U.S.C. § 11 (1970).
7 2 U.S.C.A. § 437c(a)(1)(A)-(B) (Pamphlet 1, 1975).
8 Id. § 437c(a) (1) (C).
9 Id. § 437c(a)(1).
10 The U.S.C. General Index lists no general definition for a legislative agency.
11 Buckley v. Valeo, Civil No. 75-0001, at 1573-76 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 15, 1975).
12 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
13 The Philippine Legislature is equivalent to the United States Congress.
14 The Philippine Governor General is equivalent to the President of the United States.
15 277 U.S. at 201.
16 See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); Williams v. United States, 289
U.S. 533 (1933).
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to a legislative agency, and therefore is logically applicable in determining
whether the FEC is actually a legislative agency.
Under Springer, a legislative agency would have first to exhibit a primary
involvement' in legislative activity. The FEC does perform various legislative
functions, including developing a filing and reporting system for candidates and
serving as a clearinghouse for all election reports.'" These functions, however,
must be compared with the nonlegislative functions to ascertain whether the FEC
is primarily legislative. The FEC's organizational structure emphasizes enforce-
ment and administration rather than legislation. The FEC has the power to issue
advisory opinions,'9 to initiate suits,2" to formulate general policy with respect to
the provisions of the Act and of the criminal law,2 and to conduct investiga-
tions." Moreover, an examination of legislative history underscores the con-
clusion that the FEC is not primarily legislative.22
The second attribute of a legislative agency, according to the Springer
definition, is that it be only incidentally involved in executive or judicial func-
tions. Since the FECAA itself enumerates several nonlegislative duties for the
FEC, it is clear that the agency is more than incidentally involved in executive
and judicial functions. The Buckley decision then improperly relied on Springer,
since it did not satisfy either of Springer's criteria of a legislative body or, alter-
nately, modify these criteria.
B. The Federal Election Commission: An Administrative Agency
Since Springer indicated that the FEC does not meet the basic definitional
requirements of a legislative agency, the Commission could be properly classified
as an administrative agency. 4 Bernard Schwartz25 suggests that "present day
administrative agencies are vested with authority to prescribe generally what
shall or shall not be done in a given situation; to determine whether the law has
been violated in particular cases and to proceed against the violators....
In other words, an administrative agency is a hybrid of the separate branches of
government which allows it to promulgate rules, to determine if the rules have
been violated, and to proceed against the violators.
Clearly, the rulemaking power is present under the FEC's ability to make,
amend, and repeal such rules as are necessary to carry out the provisions of the
17 Similarly, an agency will not be categorized as legislative simply because it is involved
in some legislative activity. Yet, the Buckley court adopted this very reasoning when compar-
ing the the FEC with the Comptroller General. The Buckley court reasoned that since the
FEC conducted audits like the Comptroller General, the FEC was also legislative. In reaching
this conclusion, the court's reasoning contradicts the test of primary involvement as enunciated
in Springer.
18 2 U.S.C.A. § 438(a)-(b) (Pamphet 1, 1975).
19 Id. § 437d(a)(7).
20 Id. § 437d(a) (6).
21 Id. § 437d(a)(9).
22 Id. § 437d(a) (11).
23 See text accompanying notes 33-35 infra.
24 An administrative agency is defined by statute in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 551 (1970).
25 Professor at New York University's School of Law, and noted authority in administra-
tive law.
26 B. ScHWARTZ, AN INTRoDucT oN To AMERuCAN ADMINsTATIvE LA W 8 (1958).
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Act. 7 The FEC's power to issue subpoenas,28 to administer oaths,29 and to con-
duct investigations 0 fulfills the second definitional requirement of an adminis-
trative agency, which is to determine whether the law has been violated. Finally,
the FEC is vested with statutory power to initiate, defend, or appeal any civil
action in the name of the Commission for the purpose of enforcing the general
provisions of the Act." Accordingly, the FEC fulfills all the definitional require-
ments of an administrative agency; indeed its powers resemble the powers of
other administrative agencies.2 The ICC and the FTC possess similar powers,
including the powers to formulate rules and regulations, issue subpoenas, admin-
ister oaths, conduct investigations, and seek enforcement of various provisions
of their respective acts. It is unlikely that Congress intended the FEC to be a leg-
islative agency when other agencies with similar powers have been defined as
administrative.
The legislative history substantiates the conclusion that Congress, in creating
the FEC, intended to establish an administrative agency. Both the House Com-
mittee on Administration" and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administra-
tion"' referred to the establishment of an "independent" agency. The Commit-
tees' emphasis on the FEC's independence indicates that Congress did not intend
that the FEC answer directly to any one of the three branches of government.
Having rejected these possibilities, it must be concluded that the Congress 5
created the logical alternative-a Commission vested with overlapping executive,
judicial, and legislative powers which, at least according to the Schwartz defini-
tion, is an administrative agency. Thus, with the nature of the FEC better
established, the constitutionality of appointments to the FEC can be properly
analyzed.
C. An Examination of Article II, § I
Any examination of a constitutional provision must begin from a historical
perspective. In this regard, as early as 1837 the Attorney General determined
that the Senate lacked constitutional power to initiate appointments.8 The first
judicial precedent supporting this proposition can be found in Myers v. United
States;7 the plaintiff there, an employee of the executive branch, was removed
from his post by the President. The plaintiff argued that he could not be re-
27 2 U.S.C.A. § 437d(a)(8) (Pamphet 1, 1975).
28 Id. § 437(a) (3).
29 Id. § 437d(a)(2).
30 Id. § 437(a)(11).
31 Id. § 437d(a) (6).
32 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 45, 46 (1970); 47 U.S.C. §§ 11, 303 (1970); 49 U.S.C. §
12 (1970).
33 H. R. Rs'. No. 1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974).
34 S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974).
35 As further evidence that the FEC was meant to be an administrative agency, House
debate on the FEC included these comments: "An independent commission would eliminate
the present conflicts of interest, reverse the long history of non-enforcement, and achieve proper
integration of the administrative and enforcement mechanisms of the law." 120 CONG. Ran.
7831 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1974).
36 3 Op. AT7'Y GEN. 188 (1837).
37 272 U.S. 52 (1926). See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
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moved unless the Presidential order was issued with the advice and consent of
the Senate. Because appointment and removal are so closely intertwined, the
Myers Court found it necessary to explore the historical precedents of appoint-
ment. The Court found that both the executive and legislative branches had the
power to make appointments under the Articles of Confederation. Since this
process proved unsuccessful, the Founding Fathers reacted by drafting article II,
§ I of the Constitution, vesting exclusive appointment powers in the President.
The Myers Court reasoned that the doctrine of separation of powers was designed
to prohibit Congress from determining the powers, honors, and salaries of an
office while also selecting the officer. Based on this analysis, the Supreme Court
concluded in Myers that "Article II excludes the exercise of legislative power to
provide for appointments and removals." 8
The Myers holding-that Congress should not be allowed to both create an
office and name its officers--is equally applicable to the FEC. The potential
power of the FEC demands the application of separation of powers. The Found-
ing Fathers feared the lodging of inordinate power in any one branch, and any
attempt to vest the appointment of officers in the legislative branch demands
the invocation of the Myers principle. In Humphrey's Executor v. United
States,8 the Supreme Court considered a plaintiff's challenge to the Presidential
power of removal. The only distinction between Humphrey's and its predecessor,
Myers, is that the plaintiff in Humphrey's was a member of an administrative
agency, whereas in Myers he was a member of the executive branch. Although
Humphrey's modified the Myers holding,"0 the Humphrey Court agreed with
Myers that the executive should exclusively exercise the power of appointment."1
Both Myers and Humphrey's concerned the Presidential removal power, and
therefore may not seem to control the appointment process of the FEC. The
Supreme Court, however, has reached similar conclusions in appointment cases.
In Shoemaker v. United States,42 the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality
of the Federal Parks Commission because two of the commissioners were ap-
pointed under the Act. The Supreme Court reasoned that appointment power
belonged solely to the President, but since the commissioners designated in the
Act had been previously appointed by the President, the constitutional require-
ment had been satisfied. 8 The statute was not unconstitutional merely because
it increased the duties of officers already appointed.
Since some FEC members are not appointed by the President, the rationale
of Shoemaker-that the President must make appointments-would suggest
that the FEC appointment process is unconstitutional. Nor does the statute
38 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926).
39 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
40 The Myers Court had vested removal power in the President, but Humphrey's held that
removal power should not belong to the President with respect to administrative agencies.
The Humphrey Court reasoned that if the President possessed removal powers he could ef-
fectively limit administrative agency independence with the threat of dismissal. Id. at 630-32.
41 The very words of the Court support this contention, "a body [referring to the FTC]
which shall be independent of executive authority, except in its selection" (emphasis added
by the Court). In choosing to emphasize the words "except in its selection," the Humphrey
Court underscored the necessity of Presidential appointment. Id. at 625.
42 147 U.S. 282 (1893).
43 Id. at 301.
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create new duties for previously appointed officers, because § 437c(a) (3) ex-
pressly prohibits those who are currently serving as Presidential appointees from
being appointed to the FEC.44
Springer v. Philippine Islands" also casts suspicion on the constitutionality
of the FEC's appointment process. As previously noted, Springer considered the
Philippine Legislature's appointment of members to a national management
board. The Springer Court noted that Myers had established that the executive
branch has exclusive power to make appointments. The Springer decision on this
issue is merely a reassertion of the Myers reasoning, in an appointment context.
However, the real importance of Springer is that the Court held that a legislative
body's power of appointment is unconstitutional.46 Thus, Congress' power to
appoint members of the FEC is unconstitutional.
Myers offers historical evidence that the Founding Fathers intended the
appointment power of the President to be exclusive. That decision was held
applicable to administrative agencies in Humphrey's. Although both cases in-
volved removals, the Court reached similar decisions in Shoemaker and Springer,
both appointment cases. This historical and judicial precedent indicates that
Congress should repeal those sections of the bill that provide for four congres-
sional appointments to the FEC. Congress should then require that all six voting
members of the FEC be appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate. Congress would retain a modicum of control over the appoint-
ments through such a process. If Congress desires to reserve more control over the
appointment process, it could require the President to make his appointments
from a list of names submitted by Congress. However, such a proposal may also
be unconstitutional since it may still involve the legislative branch in the appoint-
ment process to an extent that effectively usurps the Presidential appointment
power and that far exceeds the constitutional scope of "advice and consent."
III. The Power of the Federal Election Commission
to Make Rules and Regulations
The FEC's power to issue election rules and regulations raises another
constitutional issue. The FEC, like other administrative agencies,4 7 has statutory
authority to issue rules and regulations." The validity of this authority, however,
is questionable since article I, § 4 dictates that "The Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations. . . .""' The FEC's power to issue rules and
regulations conflicts with the Constitution, since its administrative rules and
44 2 U.S.C.A. § 437c(a)(3) (Pamphlet 1, 1975).
45 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
46 Id. at 202-04.
47 E.g., 47 U.S.C. § 17(3) (1970); 49 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1970). The power of admin-
istrative agencies to make rules and regulations has been constitutionally upheld. See gen-
erally ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194 (1912); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470
(1904).
48 2 U.S.C.A. § 437d(a)(8) (Pamphlet 1, 1975).
49 U.S. Const. art. I, § 4 (emphasis added).
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regulations do not appear to satisfy the requirement that election regulations be
made "by Law."50
For the FEC regulations to meet this requirement, it would have to be
under one of two theories: first, that the mere passage of the FECAA of 1974
meets the "by law" requirement and therefore any rules promulgated by the
FEC are constitutional; or second, that Congress has the power to veto FEC
regulations,5 1 and by not exercising this power Congress has acted sufficiently
on the regulation to meet the "by law" requirement.
There are no cases defining "by law" as used in the election clause of the
Constitution. However, "by law" is used in other sections of the Constitution,52
including article II § 2, which prescribes the process by which inferior officers
are created: "[T]he Congress may by Law vest the appointment of such inferior
officers, as they think proper in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments.""3
The courts have ruled on the type of congressional action necessary to vest
the appointment of inferior officers "by law" in the heads of departments. In
Burnap v. United States,54 the plaintiff contended that he was an officer of the
United States because a general appropriations bill had created his office "by
law." The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the general appropriations
bill would not meet the "by law" requirement. "Whether the officer is an officer
or an employee is determined by the manner in which Congress has specifically
provided for the creation of the position."5
The federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois confronted
the same issue in Cain v. United States.5" The plaintiff there sought back wages
from the Government. In response, the Government cited a special statutory
provision that maintained that if the plaintiff was an officer of the Government,
the district court did not have jurisdiction of the plaintiff's claim. The Govern-
ment argued that the passage of a general appropriations bill made the plaintiff
an officer of the Government, thus leaving the court without jurisdiction. The
court rejected this argument, however, and reasoned from Burnap that "by law"
within the context of article II, § 1 meant specific legislation, as opposed to a
general appropriations bill.57 The specific nature of the FECAA of 1974 should
not be confused with the general nature of the FEC's power to make rules and
regulations. The statute dictates that the FEC has the "power to make, amend,
and repeal such rules . . . as are necessary to carry out the provisions of the
50 The distinction between election regulations and other regulations can be demonstrated
by comparing two clauses of the Constitution. Election regulations are controlled by article
I, § 4: "The Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such regulations ... ." (emphasis
added). In contrast are commerce regulations controlled by article I, § 8: "Congress shall have
the power to regulate commerce." There is no restriction in article I, § 8 that commerce reg-
ulations be made "by Law." The "by Law" provision of article I, § 4 makes election law
regulation sui generis.
51 2 U.S.C.A. § 438c(1)-(2) (Pamphlet 1, 1975).
52 See U.S. CoNrsT. art. I, §§ 4, 6; art. II, §§ 1, 2; art. III, § 3; amend. VI; amend.
XIV, § 4; amend. XX, §§ 2-4; amend. XXV, § 4.
53 U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2 (emphasis added).
54 252 U.S. 512 (1920).
55 Id. at 516.
56 73 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ill. 1947).
57 Id. at 1021.
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Act" ;"8 the statute, then, appears to fail the specific legislation test of Cain and
Burnap.
Since "by law" in article I, § 4 has not been interpreted by the courts, the
precedential value of Cain and Burnap must be considered controlling. In both
Cain and Burnap, courts rejected the argument that a general appropriations
bill would satisfy the "by law" requirement. The precedent would arguably
apply to any congressional attempt to satisfy the "by law" requirement of creat-
ing election regulations with a general statute providing for the FEC to issue
rules and regulations. Cain and Burnap also suggest that if a general statute
would not satisfy the "by law" requirement, the regulations of an administrative
agency, which are not statutory in nature, would likewise fail to satisfy the "by
law" requirement.
Even though the regulations of the FEC do not meet the "by law" require-
ment, the requirement might be satisfied by a congressional failure to exercise its
legislative veto. Under this section of the statute,59 each FEC regulation is sent to
Congress for its examination. If Congress does not veto the regulation within 30
days, it becomes effective. It could be argued that Congress has studied the regu-
lations and in choosing not to veto has acted "by law."
Aid in determining whether failure to exercise a legislative veto satisfies the
"by law" requirement can be found in Springer v. Philippine Islands." Springer
dealt with a legislature's power to constitutionally appoint members of a national
management board. The defendants argued that, since Congress had not vetoed
the appointment process, it must have ratified it. The Court reasoned that if
Congress consented to this appointment process, something more than inaction
was necessary, since the fundamental principle of separation of powers was at
issue."' The same argument could be applied when considering the fundamental
issue of election regulations under article I, § 4. Springer would require some-
thing more than mere inaction on the part of Congress for the "by law" require-
ment of the Constitution to be satisfied.
The legislative veto process is at best a backhanded way of approving leg-
islation.62 It is certainly insufficient to meet the requirements of specific legisla-
tion required by Burnap and Cain. Springer suggests that in important consti-
tutional matters, congressional inaction cannot be equated with congressional
approval. Congress should repeal § 438c(l)-(2), which provides for a regula-
tion to become effective unless Congress vetoes it. Instead, Congress can provide
that the FEC submit an annual report of legislative recommendations. The
Congress could then act by specific statute in adopting the regulations it deems
necessary for effective election legislation.
58 2 U.S.O.A. § 437d(a) (8) (Pamphlet 1, 1975).
59 Id. § 438c(I)-(2) (Pamphlet 1, 1975).
60 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
61 Id. at 209.
62 For a detailed analysis of the legislative veto, see J. HAI s, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL
oF ADmINSTRATION (1964).
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IV. The Power of the Federal Election Commission
to Disqualify Candidates
The FECAA of 1974 specifies that a candidate who fails to file the ap-
propriate campaign reports will be disqualified from seeking the federal office
for which he is a candidate.6" The statute, in creating the additional qualifica-
tion of filing campaign reports, raises the difficult constitutional question of
whether Congress can add to the qualifications for federal office, which are
limited by the Constitution to age, citizenship, and residency.6"
Article I, § 2 lists the qualifications for the House Representatives, article
II, § 3 for the Senate, and article II, § 1 for the Presidency. The historical back-
ground of the these sections indicates that the Founding Fathers intended the
constitutional qualifications to remain exclusive. Justice Story, in his Com-
mentaries on the Constitution, wrote: "It would seem but fair reasoning upon
the plainest principles of interpretation, that when the Constitution established
certain qualifications as necessary for office, it meant to exclude all others as
prerequisites."65 The Federalist offers equally valuable historical evidence that
the qualifications were designed to be exclusive. "The qualifications of the person
who may be... chosen... are defined and fixed in the Constitution and are
unalterable by the legislature." 6
The recent Supreme Court decision in Powell v. McCormack" illustrates
why the Founding Fathers intended that the qualifications for federal office
be exclusive. In Powell, the plaintiff was prohibited from taking his seat in the
House of Representatives by a congressional resolution that charged him with
abusing the judicial process and misappropriating public funds. The plaintiff
challenged this exclusion, arguing that the Constitution provided exclusive qual-
ifications for holding federal office, and therefore the charges lodged against him
were not germane to his right to hold office.
In reaching its decision, the Court thoroughly considered qualifications in
general under article II, § 1:
No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the Age of
twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a citizen of the United States and
who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he
shall be chosen.
The Court noted that England, at the time of the drafting of the Constitution,
had been plagued by Parliament's imposition of additional qualifications for
63 2 U.S.C.A. § 456(a) (Pamphlet 1, 1975).
64 The congressional rationale for passing the disqualification provision may be related to
the Ohio court upholding the constitutionality of an Ohio disqualification statute, OHIo Rv.
CODE ANN. §§ 3517 (10)-(11) (Page 1972), in State ex rel. Lukens v. Brown, 34 Ohio St. 2d
257, 298 N.E.2d 132 (1973). The case is not controlling on the constitutionality of the
FEC's disqualification powers because the Ohio statute only disqualified candidates for state
office. There was no statutory infringement on the constitutional qualifications for seeking
federal office.
65 1 J. STOPY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNsTrruTIoN OF THE UNITED STATES § 625
(4th ed. 1873).
66 THE FEDERtAIST No. 60, at 340 (J. Madison ed. 1826) (A. Hamilton).
67 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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office, thus eliminating all but a select few from participating in representative
government. The specific constitutional qualifications for office were designed to
avoid a recurrence of this problem in America. The Powell Court concluded that
Congress is powerless to exclude any person who is duly elected by his con-
stituents, and who meets all the requirements for office expressly prescribed by
the Constitution."
The historical analysis of Powell appears to render any attempt at imposing
an additional qualification of filing reports upon those seeking federal office un-
constitutional. While the Powell decision considered the seating of a Represen-
tative, this does not distinguish it from the question presented by the FEC legis-
lation adding candidacy as a qualification. Both cases involve the right to hold
federal office, for a person cannot hold federal office unless he is first a candidate
and second is seated. While Powell considered the right to hold federal office
from a postelection perspective, other cases have considered pre-election quali-
fications affecting the right to hold office.
Pre-election qualifications were considered in State ex rel. Sundfor v. Thor-
sen, 9 where a North Dakota statute read: "[A]ny person who was a candidate
for nomination for office at any primary election in any year and who was de-
feated for said office shall not be eligible as a candidate for the same office at the
ensuing election."7 The North Dakota supreme court found the statute uncon-
stitutional, reasoning that the statutory language explicitly barred a candidacy,
and consequently imposed an unconstitutional qualification for seeking a federal
office.
The North Dakota statute is distinguishable from the California statute71
considered by the Supreme Court in Storer v. Brown.7" The California statute
provided that an independent candidate could not be placed on the general
election ballot if he had voted in the preceding primary election, or had been
registered with a qualified political party for up to one year prior to election day.
The Storer Court noted that under the California statute, an independent can-
didate was only refused a place on the ballot; it did not totally bar his candi-
dacy." The statute was held constitutional because, unlike the North Dakota
statute, it did not prohibit a candidacy but rather limited a candidate's access
to the ballot. A requirement that must be met to obtain a place on the ballot
does not impose an additional qualification on those seeking to be candidates;
they may conceivably run as write-in candidates.
The Storer Court's holding was the first indication that the exclusivity of
the constitutional qualifications may be modified by the Court. The Court held
that since the candidate could still run as a write-in, no additional qualifications
were imposed. Yet no campaign for federal elective office can realistically be
waged through a write-in. The Storer Court appeared to draw a tenuous distinc-
68 Id. at 522.
69 72 N.D. 246, 6 N.W.2d 89 (1942).
70 N.D. CODE ANN. ch. 141, § 1 (1939), as amended, N.D. CODE ANN. § 16-06-06
(1960). It is important to note that the North Dakota statute as amended parallels the
California statute which was upheld in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
71 CAL. ELECTION CODE §§ 6830(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1975).
72 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
73 Id. at 746.
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tion when relying on the possibility of a write-in to overcome an added burden
in running for office. This holding may signal that the Supreme Court is willing
to find constitutional those statutes which impose additional procedural require-
ments for those seeking federal office.
But the FECAA's disqualification provision more closely resembles the
North Dakota statute declared unconstitutional in Thorsen. Section 456 of the
FECAA of 1974, like the North Dakota statute, totally bars a federal candidacy
if its requirements are not met. In contrast, the California statute considered in
Storer only limits a candidate's access to the ballot. These cases, coupled with the
historical precedent of Powell, suggest that the congressional attempt under the
FECAA to enact a disqualification provision is void. It is also clear from an
analysis of both Thorsen and Storer that the nature of the disqualification pro-
vision under FECAA imposes a new qualification that could totally bar those
seeking federal office, a bar impermissible under the Constitution.
V. The Power of the Federal Election Commission to Enforce the Law
The process of FEC law-enforcement consists of these powers which were
constitutionally challenged by Judge MacKinnon's dissent in Buckley. 4 Those
powers are: (1) to investigate violations of the FECAA of 1974;75 (2) to formu-
late general policy with respect to the criminal provisions of the Act;7" and (3)
to initiate civil proceeding for the enforcement of the Act. A determination of
the constitutionality of each power requires individual consideration.
A. The Power of the Federal Election Commission to Conduct Investigations
Generally, administrative agencies have investigative powers,78 and the
FEC is no exception. However, the scope of these powers merits constitutional
scrutiny. In his dissent, Judge MacKinnon argued that the FECAA of 1974
vests the FEC with investigatory powers designed to elicit information which
will result in civil or criminal action. He argued that article II limits enforce-
ment power to the executive branch and does not allow an agency to exercise
such a power.7 However, Judge MacKinnon's interpretation of the proper
scope of agencies' investigative powers is not consistent with current case law.
The first decision on the scope of agency investigation powers was Harri-
man v. ICC.8" The defendant there refused to answer certain questions during
an ICC investigation, contending that the investigation was beyond the scope of
the ICC's investigatory powers. The statute allowed the ICC to investigate "for
the purposes of this Act."' The Supreme Court reasoned from the legislative
74 Buckley v. Valeo, Civil No. 75-0001 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 15, 1975) (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting).
75 2 U.S.C.A. § 437d(a) (11) (Pamphlet 1, 1975).
76 Id. § 437d(a)(9).
77 Id. § 437d(a) (6).
78 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (1970); 49 U.S.C. § 13(3) (1970).
79 Buckley v. Valeo, Civil No. 75-0001, at 1619 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 15, 1975) (Mac-
Kinnon, J., dissenting).
80 211 U.S. 407 (1908).
81 Id. at 418.
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history that the purpose of the Act was to regulate and enforce interstate com-
merce, and therefore only such investigations were proper. The Court agreed
with the plaintiff that the ICC's investigation did not encompass a statutory
violation and was thus beyond the purpose of the Act. Harriman indicated that
an agency would be limited to investigate only when an apparent violation of
the statute had occurred. The MacKinnon dissent was erroneous even under
Harriman, the earliest and, as will be demonstrated, narrowest holding regarding
agencies' power to investigate. Under Harriman the FEC would clearly be
allowed to conduct investigations of possible violations of the Act that elicit in-
formation which could be used in either a civil or criminal action.
The Harriman rule was expanded in United States v. Morton Salt Inc."2
In Morton Salt, the Federal Trade Commission began conducting investigations
that were beyond the scope of the Harriman limits of investigating only for
express statutory violations. The Court examined the background of the Harri-
man decision and found that its narrow ruling stemmed from earlier Court de-
cisions which had held that since the judiciary could not investigate, neither
should an agency. The Court held that this judicial limitation did not apply to
administrative agencies, thus rejecting the narrow holding of Harriman. Instead,
the Morton Salt Court adopted a broader policy for administrative agency in-
vestigations by reasoning that such agencies were developed to assist in law en-
forcement which creates "a power of inquisition... not derived from the judicial
function.""8 The Morton Salt Court policy allows an administrative agency to
investigate even when there is no evidence that any possible statutory violation
has occurred.8"
Since the FEC is an administrative agency and its purpose is enforcement-
oriented, the precedent of Morton Salt is applicable. The MacKinnon dissent
suggests no reason for abandoning Morton Salt, nor does it cite any distinguish-
ing factors.
B. The Federal Election Commission's Power to Enforce the Criminal Law
In Ponzi v. Fessenden,"5 the Supreme Court ruled that article II of the
Constitution requires the enforcement of federal criminal law to be exclusively
vested in the Attorney General. The Ponzi decision held that any attempt to
remove the power of criminal law enforcement from the executive branch vio-
lates article II. In his dissent, 6 Judge MacKinnon argued that two provisions"
of the FECAA of 1974 allow the FEC to enforce criminal sanctions, thus render-
ing these sections unconstitutional. However, a thorough development of legis-
lative materials supports the majority holding that the FEC does not enforce
82 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
83 Id. at 642.
84 Id. at 642-43.
85 258 U.S. 254 (1922). See Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 147 (1921);
In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890); United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888).
86 Buckley v. Valeo, Civil No. 75-0001, at 1617 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 15, 1975) (MacKin-
non, J., dissenting).
87 2 U.S.C.A. § 437c(b), d(a) (6) (Pamphlet 1. 1975).
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criminal sanctions, and therefore does not violate the Ponzi interpretation of
article II.
The original Senate bill that later became the FECAA of 1974 would sup-
port Judge MacKinnon's argument that the FEC possesses unconstitutional
enforcement powers."5 The bill defined the FEC as the primary civil and crimi-
nal enforcement agency of the FECAA of 1974.89 Unlike its House counter-
part,"0 the Senate bill contained no provision for referring criminal violations to
the Attorney General. The Senate's objectives in drafting the bill, as explained
in the report of the Committee on Rules and Administration, also exhibit an
intent to vest the FEC with criminal enforcement powers: "The Commission is
given broad powers including the power to ... prosecute criminal cases."91 The
Senate bill, then, is an attempt to vest an unconstitutional criminal enforcement
power in the FEC. 2 The House bill, however, leads to a significantly different
conclusion.
The original House bill,9" later adopted in conference, directs the Super-
visory Board, the House's predecessor to the FEC, to refer apparent criminal
violations of the act to appropriate agencies.94 The legislative history of this
section supports that conclusion: "The Board is authorized to encourage volun-
tary compliance through informal means and refer appropriate apparent viola-
tions to the Justice Department for civil or criminal action."9 5 Thus, Congress
rejected the provisions of the original Senate bill that purported to give the FEC
unconstitutional criminal enforcement powers.9"
C. The Federal Election Commission's Power of Civil Enforcement
The final constitutional question concerning the FEC's enforcement power
emanates from that section which allows the FEC to initiate civil suits to force
88 S. 3044, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
89 Id. § 309(d) (emphasis added).
90 See text accompanying notes 93-95 infra.
91 S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974).
92 Further evidence for this conclusion is found in S. 3044, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 309(a)
(6) (1974), which allows the FEC to "initiate, prosecute, defend or appeal any civil or
criminal action in the name of the Commission. ..
93 H.R. 16090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
94 Id. § 311(c)(1)(C)(i).
95 H.R. REP. No. 1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974).
96 Another criminal enforcement problem was raised by Judge MacKinnon. In his dis-
sent in Buckley, he argued that the FECAA of 1974 infringed upon the Attorney General's
power of prosecutorial discretion. His argument was based on the specific wording of the
statute which reads, "[U]pon the request of the Commission the Attorney General on behalf
of the United States, shall institute a civil action for relief. . . ." MacKinnon argued that
the word "shall" means that the Attorney General must institute suit at the direction of
the FEC, consequently voiding his power of prosecutorial discretion. Buckley v. Valeo, Civil
No. 75-0001, at 1612-18 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 15, 1975) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
This argument is not persuasive in light of the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States
v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). The court stated, "It
follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to
interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United
States in their control over criminal prosecutions." Id. at 171 (emphasis added). Since the
word "shall" is used in the FECAA of 1974 only with reference to civil actions, the Cox
principle does not apply. Cox illustrates that the constitutional problems with infringement
prosecutorial discretion arise only in criminal cases.
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compliance with the FECAA of 1974."7 In his dissent, Judge MacKinnon
argued that this civil enforcement power is unconstitutional because article II
reserves all enforcement power to the executive branch. 8 Although an initial
analysis might support the dissent, closer scrutiny of the statute and recent case
law dictates that the provision is constitutional.
The dissent reached an incorrect result because it failed to distinguish be-
tween civil and criminal enforcement. Criminal enforcement must be exercised
by the Executive,99 and the FEC complies with this requirement. Civil enforce-
ment, contrary to the dissent's assertion, need not rest exclusively in the executive
branch. Instead, current case law has held that civil enforcement powers may
constitutionally be exercised by administrative agencies.
The Supreme Court's initial decision in this area was Texas & Pacific
Railroad v. ICC.' The ICC initiated a civil suit to enforce provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act; the Court ruled that the suit was proper. The ICC's
right to initiate the suit was not decided on a constitutional basis, but on the
basis of a congressional intent to give the ICC this power.' Implicit in the
Court's decision, however, was the assumption that the ICC's enforcement
powers were constitutional.
The Court more directly confronted an administrative agency's power of
civil enforcement in United States v. Morton Salt Inc."0 2 The defendant there
had been ordered by the circuit court 3 to file a detailed set of reports regarding
sales practices in the salt industry. In addition, the FTC issued its own order re-
quiring that the defendants submit additional reports. The defendants' refusal
to comply with the FTC order resulted in a civil suit. The Morton Salt Court
noted that the purpose of the Federal Trade Commission Act was to prevent
unfair practices within interstate commerce. The Court reasoned that an ad-
ministrative agency could only make this policy effective by exercising initiative
and flexibility. in the legal process. The Court concluded its opinion by stating
that the FTC had a staff to institute proceedings and was properly vested with
the responsibility to initiate actions.
The Court's reasoning seems to apply to the FEC. The congressional
objectives of the FEC are to prevent unfair election practices. This is certainly
analogous to the purpose of the FTC noted in Morton Salt. Undeniably, the
FEC's purpose would be partially frustrated if it had no civil enforcement power,
a concern behind the Morton Salt decision that allowed the FTC to exercise civil
enforcement powers. Therefore, Morton Salt's holding has a broad application
to the power of the FEC to initiate civil suits.
The most recent decision in this area is the Seventh Circuit's holding in ICC
97 2 U.S.C.A. § 437d(a)(6) (Pamphlet 1, 1975).
98 Buckley v. Valeo, Civil No. 75-0001, at 1614 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 15, 1975) (MacKin-
non, J., dissenting).
99 See cases cited in note 85 supra.
100 162 U.S. 197 (1896).
101 Id. at 204.
102 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
103 Salt Producers Ass'n v. FTC, 134 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1943).
104 338 U.S. at 640. Accord, Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
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v. Chatsworth Cooperative Market.' In Chatsworth, the ICC sought a per-
manent injunction against the defendants for violations of the Interstate Com-
merce Act. The defendants admitted the violations, but appealed to the circuit
court, arguing that the section of the Act 0 which allowed the ICC to seek a
civil injunction was unconstitutional. The defendants argued that all enforce-
ment powers belonged to the Executive and that since the statute gave the ICC
civil enforcement powers, it was unconstitutional. The court ruled the statute
constitutional because it did not encroach on the Executive's power of enforce-
ment. The court reasoned that the ICC was merely exercising an executive
function which was constitutionally acceptable.' The distinction between ex-
ecutive power-power explicitly reserved to the Executive in the Constitution-
and executive function-power that is not explicitly reserved-was developed by
the Supreme Court in Humphrey's Executor v. United States.' Since the power
to initiate civil litigation to enforce an Act is not explicitly reserved to the Execu-
tive in the Constitution, it is an executive function which the ICC can con-
stitutionally perform.
In the early decision of Texas & Pacific Railroad, the Court found con-
gressional intent to allow an administrative agency to initiate civil suits. The
Court looked more specifically at the constitutional issues in Morton Salt. The
Morton Salt reasoning that an administrative agency needs civil enforcement
powers to carry out its legislative purpose clearly applies to the FEC. In Chats-
worth, an even more specific holding found that it was constitutional for the ICC
to seek a civil injunction. Chatsworth leaves little doubt that the FEC's power
of civil enforcement is constitutional.
VI. Conclusion
During the Great Depression, Chief Justice Hughes wrote: "Extraordinary
conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power."'09 Yet when faced
with a serious political crisis, Congress by passing the FECAA of 1974 failed to
heed the warning of the Chief Justice.
The legislative history of the Act resounds with debates and statements
about election reform, but an atmosphere of political crisis underlay all of the
rhetoric. As a result, Congress ignored the Constitution when establishing certain
provisions with respect to the FEC. The appointment process violated one of the
most basic constitutional tenets-appointments are to be made by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Commission's power to make
rules and regulations does not conform to the constitutional requirement that all
election regulations be made "by law." The FEC's power to disqualify can-
didates undermines the exclusive qualifications found in the Constitution.
It is hoped that Congress will act in an expeditious manner to change the
FECAA of 1974 to comply with the Constitution. Once the Act is so reformed,
105 347 F.2d 821 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965).
106 49 U.S.C. § 322(b) (1970).
107 347 F.2d at 822.
108 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
109 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935).
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it can begin its formidable task of overseeing the election process in a manner
that is consistent with the Constitution.
Michael T. Bierman
